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COMMENT
ANALYSIS OF REVENUE RULING 75-292: A PROPOSAL
TO ALLOW THE COMBINED USE OF SECTIONS 1031
AND 351 WITHOUT DESTROYING THE TAX-FREE
STATUS OF EITHER
Sections 10311 and 3512 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provide
exceptions to the general rule that gain or loss is immediately recog-
nized upon the sale or exchange of property.' Both sections are premised
upon the theory that continuation of an investment in merely a different
form is not a taxable event.4 Both are mandatory5 and provide for the
deferment of recognition of gain until a later taxable event occurs.6
In Revenue Ruling 75-292,1 the Internal Revenue Service examined
sections 1031 and 351 and held that an exchange by a taxpayer of
like kind business property immediately followed by a prearranged
transfer of the acquired property to his newly created corporation did
1. NT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 1031(a), provides in pertinent part:
No gain or loss shall be recognized if property held for productive use in
trade or business or for investment (nor including stock in trade or other
property held primarily for sale, nor stocks, bonds, notes ... or other securi-
ties or evidences of indebtedness or interest) is exchanged solely for prop-
erty of a like kind to be held either for productive use in trade or business
or for investment.
2. Id. § 351 (a), provides in pertinent part: "No gain or loss shall be recognized if
property is transferred to a corporation ... by one or more persons solely in exchange
for stock or securities in such corporation and immediately after the exchange such
person or persons are in control . . . of the corporation."
3. Id. § 1002, provides: "Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, on the sale or
exchange of property the entire amount of the gain or loss ... shall be recognized."
4. See notes 79-114 infra & accompanying text.
5. E.g., United States v. Vardine, 305 F.2d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 1962) (holding section 1031
mandatory); Gus Russel, Inc., 36 T.C. 965 (1961) (holding section 351 mandatory).
6. When gain or loss is not recognized the transaction is called nontaxable but in
reality there is merely a postponement of tax because corresponding adjustments of the
Code must be made to the basis of the property received or held by the taxpayer. E.g.,
NT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 358, 362.
Upon death, however, this deferral effect may become a total exemption because
under section 1014 of the Code descendant receives the property with a new basis equal
to the fair market value at the time of the inheritance. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1014.
7. Rev. Rul. 75-292, 1975 IN.T. REv. BuLL. No. 29, at 18.
8. Hereinafter referred to as the Service.
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not qualify under section 1031. The reason given for this conclusion
was that the taxpayer had acquired the property for transfer to his
controlled corporation in exchange for stock rather than to hold for
productive use in trade or business or for investment.'
Because of the similar underlying legislative policies of both sections,1°
the Service's ruling has provoked charges of literalism and the con-
tention that the phrase "property to be held for productive use in trade
or business or for investment" should be construed to embrace property
acquired for exchange in a subsequent tax-free transaction.1 The above
contention is persuasive, as it would allow a taxpayer to engage in
successive bona fide section 1031 exchanges [hereinafter referred to as
three-party, two-step exchanges] and still receive tax-free treatment at
both stages,' 2 a result within the legislative contemplation of section
1031.13 Indeed, the reasoning of the revenue ruling, carried to its logical
conclusion, would prevent transactions involving the reexchange of like
kind property from qualifying under section 1031, for the taxpayer
would have acquired the property not to hold for productive business
use, or for investment, but for exchange. This result is indefensible as
such transactions are closely analogous to simultaneous three-way
exchanges permitted by the Service.14
Thus, it appears that the rationale for denial of section 1031 treatment
in a tandem sections 1031-351 transfer is not the one stated, but rather
9. Rev. Rul. 75-292, 1975 INT. Rav. BULL. No. 29, at 19.
The application of the Service's reasoning to the reverse situation, in which there
occurs an incorporation and a section 351 transfer of property to the corporation fol-
lowed by a section 1031 exchange between the newly formed corporation and an un-
related corporation, presumably would lead to the same result as that in Revenue
Ruling 75-292, because the newly created corporation acquired the property with a view
to exchanging, not holding it.
10. See notes 79-104 infra & accompanying text.
11. Literalism Triumphs as IRS Taxes Like-Kind Exchange Followed By Incorpora-
tion of Property Received, 759 CCH RxwoRD 8118 at 75338 (1975).
12. For example, when A, B, and C own PA, PB, and PC respectively and engage
in the following:
A exchanges PA with B for PB;
A subsequently exchanges PB with C for PC;
A should receive tax-free treatment on both exchanges, despite the fact that A acquired
PB solely to exchange it for PC.
13. See notes 79-104 infra & accompanying text.
14. A, B, and C effect the exchange by having A transfer his property to B, B then
transfers his to C, and C transfers his to A. See Rev. Rul. 57-244, 1957-1 CuM. BuLL 247,




is that, under the step transaction doctrine,1 as an end result, like kind
property was exchanged for stock, property that expressly is precluded
from the definition of like kind.' Although premised on the wrong
reason, the conclusion of the ruling appears to be correct under the
existing statute. It is submitted that, notwithstanding the imper-
missible end result under section 1031 of receipt of stock, legislative
policy, as evinced through the shared legislative history of the two sec-
tions, dictates a revision of section 1031 to permit the combined use of
sections 1031 and 351.
THE BouNDAms OF A PERMISSMLE SECTION
1031 EXCHANGE
Although no cases have been decided involving successive sections
1031 and 351 exchangesS1 section 1031 has long been used for three-
cornered or multiparty exchanges.' s In the absence of an applicable
statutory definition of "exchange,"' 8 several cases& 0 have established
that the word is to be given its ordinary meaning: a transfer of property
for property as opposed to a transfer of property for money.
15. See notes 115-32 infra & accompanying text.
16. See note 1 supra.
17. In Mays v. Campbell, 246 F. Supp. 375 (N.D. Tex. 1965), however, the court
found an acceptable section 1031 exchange between the taxpayer and a foundation,
followed by a sale by the foundation to the taxpayer's controlled corporation. Although
the second transfer clearly was not a section 351 exchange in that the transferor was
not afterwards in control of the corporation, the decision suggests that a controlled
corporation may be added as a third party to the transaction so that the corporation
receives a stepped-up basis yet the taxpayer pays no capital gain tax. Dean, Real Estate:
Defining the Outer Limits in a Section 1031 Three-party Exchange, 28 J. TAXATIo N 294,
297 (1968).
18. See, e.g., Mercantile Trust Co., 32 B.TA. 82 (1935), acqudesced in, XIV-1 CuM.
BUt.. 13 (1935) (the first three-party case).
For a thorough discussion of the problems encountered and the form to follow in
effective multiparty exchanges, see Cruikshank, IRS Seeking to Tax Like-Kind Ex-
changes as Cash Sale and Reinvestment, 16 J. TAXA-ION 174 (1962); Dean, supra note
17; Gannet, Sale or Tax-free Exchange? How to Decide What You Want: Tax Plan-
ning to Get It, 30 J. TAXATON 226 (Apr. 1969); West & Chodorow, New Case Points
Up Planning Techniques in Tax-Free Exchanges of Real Estate, 20 J. TAXATiON 52
(1964); Winokur, Real Estate Exchanges: The Three Cornered Deal, N.Y.U. 28th
INsr. oN FED. TAx. 127 (1970); Three-Party Exchanges: How to Assure Tax Benefit by
Careful Planning, 34 J. TAxATiox 58 (Anderson ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Three-
Party Exchanges]; Comment, Tax Free Exchanges of Real Estate, 1966 U. lix. L.F. 466
[hereinafter cited as Tax Free].
19. Neither the applicable code section nor regulations provide clarification as to the
meaning. See 3 J. M.ERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INcoM E TAXATION § 20.28 (rev. 1972).
20. See, e.g. Bloomington Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 14, 16
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The basic premise of section 1031 is that a taxpayer who has arranged
a continuation of his investment in like kind property, thus realizing
merely a paper profit or loss, should not be taxed.21 The courts generally
have been liberal in allowing taxpayers to construct these arrangements
so as to effectuate an acceptable exchange.2 Under section 1031, the
taxpayer can create a trade situation by locating suitable property for
a prospective buyer to acquire for exchange. 2' He can enter into ne-
gotiations,24 advance money toward the purchase price 25 and even over-
see the construction of improvements on the land to be acquired.26 He
must not commit himself, however, to purchase the exchange property;
rather, he must allow the exchange buyer to actually acquire the prop-
erty 27 in a capacity other than as the agent of the taxpayer.2 8 If the
(7th Cir. 1951); Trenton Cotton Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 33, 36 (6th Cir.
1945); Badgett v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 120, 126 (W.D. Ky. 1959); Katherine A.
Spalding, 7 B.T.A. 588, 590 (1927).
21. See notes 79-114 infra & accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., Alderson v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1963); Century Elec.
Co. v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 954 (1952);
W. D. Haden Co. v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 588, 590 (5th Cir. 1948); Coastal Terminals,
Inc. v. United States, 207 F. Supp. 560 (E.D.S.C. 1962), aff'd, 320 F.2d 333 (4th Cir.
1963). But see John M. Rogers, 44 T.C. 126, aff'd per curiam, 377 F.2d 534 (9th Cir.
1967); Antone Borcard, 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1643 (1965) (court takes a more
restrictive view).
One commentator has suggested that this liberal attitude results from judicial recog-
nition that few opportunities arise when two parties desire a reciprocal exchange of
like kind property. Note, Section 1031 Exchange of Like Kind Property: A Court in
Trouble, 22 Sw. L.J. 517, 519 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Section 10311.
23. That one party does not have title to the exchange property at the time of the
agreement does not deny the benefit of section 1031 to the other party. See Rev. Rul.
75-291, 1975 INT. REv. BULL. No. 29, at 18. See also Dean, supra note 17, at 295-96;
West & Chodorow, supra note 18, at 52; Three-Party Exchanges, supra note 18, at 59.
"In effect, the exchange [in such a case is] between two parties, one of whom had, in
his own manner, previously acquired property which was to be subsequently exchanged
with that of the taxpayer." Halpern v. United States, 286 F. Supp. 255, 258 (N.D. Ga.
1968).
24. See, e.g., Alderson v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1963); Coastal Termi-
nals, Inc. v. United States, 207 F. Supp. 560 (E.D.S.C. 1962), aff'd, 320 F.2d 333 (4th Cir.
1963).
25. See, e.g., Alderson v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1963).
26. E.g., J. H. Baird Publishing Co., 39 T.C. 608 (1962) (taxpayer not only supervised
construction but approved all invoices before payment).
27. Carlton v. United States, 385 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1967). In Carltnz, because the
taxpayers took title directly from the owner rather than through the second party, they
were held to have sold, not exchanged, their property. Similarly, in John iMl. Rogers,
44 T.C. 126 (1965), aff'd per curiawrt, 377 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1967), because.the option
to buy was exercised prior to the exchange, the taxpayer was held to have sold his
property and reinvested in like kind property.
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court finds that an agency relationship exists, the taxpayer will be held
to have sold the property and to have reinvested the proceeds in like
kind property.2 9 A sale of property, even though immediately followed
by a reinvestment in like kind property, is not an exchange under
section 1031.30 In such transactions, because the taxpayer has had do-
minion, albeit momentarily, over "cash," he has "cashed in" on his invest-
ment and cannot receive favored treatment, for the requisite continuity
of interest is lacking.3'
The problems involved in three-cornered exchanges under section
1031 therefore are primarily questions of form.32 The intent of the
parties to effect an exchange is niot controlling in determining whether
an exchange in fact has occurred.33 Although the courts refer to intent,3 4
28. See, e.g., Leslie Q. Coupe, 52 T.C. 394, 406-07 (1969), acquiesced in, 1970-1 CuM.
BULL. XV.
29. See Spears & Freedman, Cirrrent Planning in Sales and Exchanges of Real Estate,
1963 So. CALIF. TAx INsr. 135. Spears and Freedman suggest that the agency issue
controls the determination of whether the taxpayer has exchanged or sold his property
and repurchased other like kind property. Id. at 192, discussing J. Baird Publishing Co.,
39 T.C. 608 (1962).
30. See, e.g., Coastal Terminals, Inc. v. United States, 320 F.2d 333, 337 (4th Cir.
1963). See also 3 J. MERTENS, supra note 19, § 20.28, at 98; Winokur, supra note 18, at
138-39. During consideration by the House of Representatives of the Revenue Act of
1924 this distinction between a sale and exchange was noted. 65 CoNG. REc. 2799
(1924) (remarks of Congressman Green and La Guardia).
31. For a possible exception to this, see Wright, Multiple-Party, Like-Kind Ex-
changes, 56 A.B.A.J. 281 (1970). There the author states that if reinvestment of the
cash proceeds in like kind property is required as part of a single transaction, then it
is arguable that section 1031 treatment should be available. Id. at 282.
Several articles contend that the courts' broad interpretation of what constitutes per-
missible actions by the taxpayer is equivalent to allowing him to sell and reinvest
the proceeds. Consequently, the commentators have espoused a revision of section
1031 to allow, as do sections 1033 (property involuntarily converted) and 1034 (sale
or exchange of residence), a sale and reinvestment of the proceeds in like kind property
within a specified period of time in order to avoid the economic waste involved in
the elaborate schemes devised to effect the form of an exchange. West & Chodorow,
s5tpra note 18, at 55 n.18; Section 1031, supra note 22, at 524-25, quoting Spears &
Freedman, Current Planning in Sales and Exchanges of Real Estate, 1963 So. CALIF.
TAx I-,sr. 193; Tax Free, supra note 18, at 473.
32. Dean, supra note 17, at 296.
33. See, e.g., Carlton v. United States, 385 F.2d 238, 243 (5th Cir. 1967); J. H. Baird
Publishing Co., 39 T.C. 608, 615 (1962). See also 3 J. MERTENS, supra note 19, § 20.14,
at 63.
In Carlton, though the taxpayers intended from the inception to exchange their
property, failure to adhere to the necessary form, by taking the deed directly from the
owner-seller rather than through the exchange partner, led the court to hold that they
sold the property. Carlton v. United States, supra.
34. See, e.g., Coastal Terminals, Inc. v. United States, 320 F.2d 333 (4th Cir. 1963);
19761
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they emphasize the form, looking to whether the deeds were actually
exchanged. 5 "So long as the formalities of an exchange are observed,
[courts seem] willing to find that an exchange has occurred." so Mere
simultaneity of execution is not sufficient;3 7 the focus is on interdepend-
ence between the transfers, 3 for if the transaction can be divided into
two unrelated transactions, a sale to the taxpayer and a sale by the
taxpayer, the desired nonrecognition treatment is lost.
Just as the courts generally are lenient in allowing taxpayers to en-
gineer multiparty transactions to achieve the requisite form of an ex-
change, so too the interpretation of what qualifies as like kind property
is broad.3 9 All real estate is of like kind;40 even an exchange of a lease-
hold of over thirty years for a fee interest is a like kind exchange.41 Be-
cause section 1031 was enacted to remove any economic barriers that
might inhibit the improvement of a taxpayer's business or investment
holdings,42 to avoid taxation of a "paper gain which [is] still tied up in
James Alderson, 38 T.C. 215 (1962), rev'd, 317 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1963).
35. See, e.g., Boise Cascade Corp., 33 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1443, 1448 (1974), quoting
Leslie Q. Coupe, 52 T.C. 394, 405 (1969).
36. Winokur, supra note 18, at 142. The Internal Revenue Service does not accept
that view. Id. Winokur contends that "there seems to be an ever increasing reliance
on the final form of the actual transaction ... [which] could mean ultimately that the
only requirement for a tax-free exchange will be an exchange of deeds when the trans-
action is finally consummated." Id. at 143.
37. Halpern v. United States, 286 F. Supp. 255, 258 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
38. E.g., Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Tomlinson, 399 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1968) (purchase
of new trucks followed by a sale of used trucks found to be a trade-in and therefore
a section 1031 exchange despite the structure of the transaction); Allegheny County
Auto Mart, Inc. v. Commissioner, 208 F.2d 693 (3d Cir. 1953) (per curiam) (simultaneous
sale and purchase of lots held to be an exchange because they were "inseparable":
transactions); see discussion of the step transaction doctrine at notes 115-132 infra &
accompanying text.
39. Treas. Reg. § 1.1031 (a)-1 (b), T.D. 6935, 1967-2 CuM. BULL. 275, provides in
pertinent part: "As used in section 1031(a), the words 'like kind' [refer] to the nature
or character of the property and not to its grade or quality. ... The fact that any
real estate involved is improved or unimproved is not material . . . :'
40. 3 J. MRa ms, supra note 19, § 20.28, at 100.
41. Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-1(c), T.D. 6935, 1967-2 CuM. BuLL. 275. The validity of
this conclusion was questioned in Masill, Notes on the Revenue Act of 1924-Income Tax
ProLisions, 24 CoLuM. L. REv. 836, 842 (1924), but was accepted in Century Elec. Co.
v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 954 (1952). A
bona fide sale of a fee with a simultaneous leaseback of 21 years was held not to be
a like kind exchange in City Investing Co, 38 T.C. 1 (1962).
42. Section 1031, supra note 22, at 524. See also notes 79-114 infra & accompanying
text.
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a continuing investment of the same sort," 43 the focus in defining "like
kind" is on whether the taxpayer received something substantially dif-
ferent from what he had before the exchange. The dispositive question,
therefore, is whether there is a taxable change in "nature or character"
(a change in substance) as opposed to a nontaxable change in "grade or
quality" (a change merely of form).44
Acknowledging the legislative intent not to tax mere changes in the
form of investment, the cases have upheld a broad interpretation of "like
kind." 45 Allowing an expansion of the meaning of "held" and "to be
held" to include acquiring property for a subsequent tax-free exchange
of like kind property would similarly be consistent with the statutory
purpose of section 1031.46 The taxpayer in such situations, unlike one
who seeks only to dispose of the property acquired to liquidate his
holdings, meets "[t]he underlying assumption of [the exceptions in sec-
tion 1031]: that the new property is substantially a continuation of the
old investment still unliquidated." 47
Several cases 8 have discussed the distinction between property held
"primarily for sale" 49 (property expressly excluded from section 1031
treatment), and "property held for productive use in trade or business
or for investment." "0 Although a mere willingness to sell does not con-
43. Jordan Marsh Co. v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 453, 456 (2d Cir. 1959).
44. Treas. Reg. 1.1031(a)-I (b), T.D. 6935, 1967-2 Cum. BULL. 275.
45. See, e.g., Century Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 324 U.S. 954 (1952).
46. Arguably the property acquired for exchange is being held for productive use in
trade or business in that it is the means through which the business or individual ac-
quires other like kind property. In other words, might it not be characterized as
investment or productive business property because it is the intervening step that effectu-
ates a like kind exchange?
47. Ethel Black, 35 T.C. 90, 94 (1960), quoting Treas. Reg. 1.1002-1(c) (1960).
48. See, e.g., Wineberg v. Comimssioner, 326 F.2d 157 (9th Cir. 1963); Regals Realty
Co. v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 931 (2d Cir. 1942); Burkhard Inv. Co. v. United States,
22 F. Supp. 23 (S.D. Cal.), aff'd, 100 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1938); Harr v. MacLaughlin,
15 F. Supp. 1004 (ED. Pa. 1936); S. H. Klarkowski, 34 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1827 (1965),
afi'd, 385 F.2d 398 (7th Cir. 1967).
49. Whether property is held "primarily for sale" is entirely a question of fact that
requires an investigation of all circumstances and activities. George M. Bernard, 26
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 858, 863 (1967). The word "primarily" means "of first importance"
or "principally." Id., citing Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569, 572 (1966) (per curiam)
(though Malat examined another section of the Internal Revenue Code, the Bernard
court found its rationale applicable to section 1031(a)).
50. No cases, however, have examined the issue of whether property acquired with a
view to transferring it to a controlled corporation in exchange for stock or to reexchang-
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clusively preclude nonrecognition,51 in those cases in which the taxpayer
was denied section 1031 treatment, the property was acquired with an
intent to resell.52 The requisite continuity of interest was lacking, and
the express words of the statute therefore affronted.43 In so concluding,
the courts in these cases did not focus on the length of holding time;
this factor may be significant, but it is not conclusive in determining the
taxpayer's purpose. Rather, the courts focused on the economic realities
surrounding the acquisition and disposal of the property.54
In Regals Realty Co. v. Conmissioner,5  for example, a corporate tax-
payer chose to exchange, rather than sell, some business real estate to
avoid paying capital gains tax. Approximately one month after the
exchange, a directors' vote to sell the acquired realty to effectuate a
complete liquidation compelled the court to decide the property was
held primarily for sale.56 The Tax Court in Ethel Black 7 reached the
ing it for other like kind property is acceptable section 1031 property. For a discussion
of the extreme difficulty of making this distinction, see 3 J. MERTNs, supra note 19,
§ 20.27, at 97.
51. In Burkhard Inv. Co. v. United States, 100 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1938), quoting
Loughborough Dev. Corp., 29 B.TA. 95, 99 (1933), property was declared held for
investment "'although such property may have been acquired with the intention of
selling or disposing of the same at some subsequent, though not early, date.. .. "
52. See, e.g., Brooks Griffin, 49 T.C. 253, 260 (1967) (a prearranged subsequent sale
foreclosed section 1031 treatment).
53. See, e.g., Regalg Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 931 (2d Cir. 1942); Harr v.
MacLaughlin, 15 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Pa. 1936); S. H. Klarkowski, 34 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 827 (1965), aft'd, 385 F.2d 398 (7th Cir. 1967). Compare Brooks Griffin, 49 T.C.
253 (1957) (lack of continuity of interest existed because taxpayer arranged sale of
property he was to receive prior to the exchange) with Rev. Bul. 75-292, 1975 INT. Ray.
BurL.. No. 29, at 18 (continuity of ownership existed as facts involved no prearranged
subsequent liquidation, but only a planned change in proprietary form from individual
to corporate ownership).
54. See, e.g, Wineberg v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 157, 163 & n.6 (9th Cir. 1963)
(timberland held an average of eight years found to be property "held primarily for
sale'); B. B. Margolis, 31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 62,086, at 521 (1962) (lots held 'many"
years does not establish an intention to hold them for investment). Economic realities
also have prompted courts to conclude that property was held for investment. See, e.g.,
Burkhard Inv. Co. v. United States, 22 F. Supp. 23, 24-5 (S.D. Cal.), aff'd, 100 F.2d
642 (9th Cir. 1938) (land acquired with the belief that it would appreciate concomitant
with the development of the surrounding area found to be property held for invest-
ment); Loughborough Dev. Corp., 29 B.T.A. 95, 96-8 (1932) (land acquired with the
view that it would appreciate concomitant with the growth of a city found to be
property held for investment).
55. 127 F.2d 931 (2d Cir. 1942).
56. Id. at 933.
57. 35 T.C. 90 (1960).
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same conclusion when the taxpayer retained the acquired property solely
for the purpose of making improvements for resale 8
After analyzing the economic realities of the exchange in George M.
Bernard,"9 the Tax Court rejected the taxpayers' assertion that the land
was acquired for farming,6 ° and concluded that it was acquired merely
because it was more readily marketable. The court noted that the ac-
quired land was smaller than the land for which it was exchanged, was
separated from the taxpayers' other farm land by a considerable distance,
and was suitable not for farming but rather for subdivision."1 The court,
therefore, looked to the taxpayers' ostensible productive use of the ex-
changed property in holding that "token farming" was incidental to their
primary concern of liquidating all of their property interests in the area.
This same practical approach was used in S. H. Klarkowski, 2 in which
the court decided that a tract of land retained for six years was held pri-
marily for sale.es The court determined pragmatically that the taxpayer
would not have exchanged improved income-producing land for non-
income-producing land unless he planned to resell the property received
so as to liquidate his investment. Thus, the courts, in denying section
1031 treatment, have emphasized the taxpayer's intent to liquidate his
holdings rather than the length of time the property was held.
In marked contrast to these cases, the facts of Revenue Ruling 75-29264
involve no liquidation of the taxpayer's investment. To the contrary, the
property acquired in the section 1031 exchange6 5 was reexehanged im-
mediately to enable the taxpayer to expand and continue, not to termi-
58. Id. at 92, 95.
59. 26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 858 (1967).
60. Id. at 864.
61. Id.
62. 34 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1827 (1965), aff'd, 385 F.2d 398 (7th Cir. 1967).
63. 34 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 1843.
64. 1975 INT. REv. BULL. No. 29, at 18.
65. Revenue Ruling 75-292 examines the nature of the taxpayer's holding after the
exchange. Id. A related revenue ruling, Rev. Rul. 75-291, 1975 INT. REV. BULL. No. 29,
at 18, focuses on the nature of the holding prior to the exchange. In Revenue Ruling
75-291, the taxpayer acquired property by purchase immediately prior to the exchange
of like kind property. He therefore was said to be ineligible for nonrecognition of
gain because he had not held the property for productive use in trade or business. Id.
This situation can be distinguished from the facts in Revenue Ruling 75-292 in that the
taxpayer did not exchange section 1031 property he had been holding but bought the
property to effect the exchange. The necessary continuity of interest was therefore
absent.
1976]
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nate, his business in merely a different form."" Ultimately, however,
through the subsequent section 351 exchange, the taxpayer received
stock, property expressly precluded from the definition of "like kind." I7
Therefore, under the existing statute, although the requisite continuity
of interest exists, the transaction is ineligible for section 1031 nonrecog-
nition treatment.6 8 In other transactions involving a three-party, two-
step exchange69 with successive section 1031 transfers, however, not
only does the taxpayer's interest remain unliquidated, but no property
precluded by the statute is received or given. Additionally, the sole
reason the property is held only briefly is so that the taxpayer may en-
gage in another like kind exchange. Without the intervention of imper-
missible property, the taxpayer has upgraded his holdings while con-
tinuing his previous investment in a different form. Also, as required,
the form of an exchange has been adhered to, with the taxpayer holding
like kind property throughout the transaction. ° Clearly, such an ex-
change is within the legislative contemplation of section 103171 and
favored treatment should be awarded at both stages.
Further support of this contention is found in Revenue Ruling
57-244,72 in which a taxpayer was allowed section 1031 treatment in a
three-way exchange even though after the exchange he sold the ac-
quired property to another individual. 7 The taxpayer's subsequent sale,
though possibly not prearranged, must have been close enough in time
to have been considered within the res gestae of the transaction. Never-
theless, the sale did not eliminate nonrecognition treatment for the tax-
payer. This ruling contradicts, and thus weakens, the Service's argument
that acquisition of property with a view to exchanging it does not meet
the statutory purpose of section 1031, in that the Service validated in
Revenue Ruling 57-244 an exchange of like kind property not acquired
for investment or productive use in trade or business.
66. The taxpayer had incorporated his sole proprietorship. Rev. Rul 75-292, 1975
INT. REv. BULL. No. 29, at 18.
67. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1031(a).
68. The section 351 transfer is not affected by the inapplicability of section 1031 to
the prior exchange and is still a valid tax-free exchange.
69. For a description of a three-party, two-step exchange, see note 12 supra.
70. See notes 17-38 supra & accompanying text in which the requirements as to the
form of an exchange under section 1031 are discussed.
71. See notes 79-114 hifra & accompanying text.
72. 1957-1 CuM. BULL. 247.
73. Id. But see cases discussed in text accompanying notes 55-63.
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Revenue Ruling 57-244, as well as the more recent Revenue Ruling
73-476, 74 expressly held that three-way transfers constitute tax-free ex-
changes under section 1031. In the earlier ruling, three taxpayers jointly
acquired undeveloped acreage which they divided into three lots. After
holding the land for five years for investment purposes, the taxpayers
exchanged lots in a three-way transaction; the exchanges were upheld as
within the meaning of section 1031. 7r In a slightly different factual
setting, Revenue Ruling 73-476 also upheld the validity of three-way
transactions under section 1031. In that ruling, three taxpayers who
owned undivided interests in three separate parcels of real estate as
tenants in common, exchanged their undivided interests in the three
properties for the complete ownership of one parcel.76
Although these three-way exchanges differ from three-party, two-
step exchanges in that in the former there is no intermediary exchange
involving the reexchange of like kind property,77 the two types 6f ex-
changes are so closely analogous as to dictate identical treatment for
both. Yet, if the reasoning used by the Service in Revenue Ruling 75-292
is applied to successive like kind exchanges, the party who reexchanges
property will be denied section 1031 treatment at both stages because
he acquired the property with a view to exchanging, not holding, it.
This disturbing result leads to the conclusion that the Service's analysis
was incorrect, for as the legislative history of the section 78 reveals, suc-
cessive section 1031 exchanges are desirable and are justified by tax
-policy.
74. 1973-1 Cum. BuLu. 301.
75. 1957-1 CUM. BUL. 247.
76. 1972-2 Cum. Bum. 301.
77. The intermediate step in a three-party, two-step exchange occurs when the tax-
payer acquires property by exchange for subsequent reexchange. For example, if A
owns PA, B owns PB, and C owns PC and A desires PC but C will accept only PB
in exchange, then A's desire may be effectuated by the following three-party, two-step
exchange:
A exchanges PA with B for PB.
A exchanges PB with C for PC.
A's exchange of PA for PB constitutes the intermediate step. (It is intermediate in the
sense that it falls between A's ownership of PA and PC.) Obviously, such a step is
lacking in a three-way exchange because in that type of transaction, A would not
acquire property to reexchange it for other property; rather a simultaneous exchange
by A, B, and C would occur. See note 14 supra.
78. See notes 79-114 infra & accompanying text.
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THE COMMON UNDERLYING PURPOSES OF SECTIONS
1031 AND 351 AS EVINCED THROUGH THEIR
LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES
As stated in the treasury regulations, because both sections 1031 and
351 are exceptions to the general rule of recognition of gain and loss,
they are construed strictly79 and "do not extend either beyond the words
or the underlying assumptions and purposes of the exception." 80 The
regulations further explain that "[t]he underlying assumption of these
exceptions is that the new property is substantially a continuation of the
old investment still unliquidated .... " 1 This administrative interpretation
of the basic policy of the sections as corroborated through an examina-
tion of their legislative histories, reveals that the provisions are based
on the premise that like kind exchanges under section 1031, and transfer
of property to a controlled corporation under section 351, are mere
changes in the form of investment and thus are not taxable events.8 2
Although as early as 1918 various exchanges of property between
taxpayers were exempt from the general rule of recognizing gain or loss,83
the basic principle that mere changes in the form of investment should
not be taxed was not given statutory recognition until the Revenue Act
of 1921.4 Significantly, in the 1921 Act the predecessor to both sections
1031 and 351 was a single section;" 5 that section transformed the pre-
79. Treas. Reg. 1.1002-1(b) (1960).
80. Id. See also George M. Bernard, 26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 858, 863 (1967), quoting in
part, Treas. Reg. 1.1002-1(b) (1960); Ethel Black, 35 T.C. 90, 94 (1960), quoting in part,
Treag. Reg. 1.1002-1(b) (1960).
81. Treas. Reg. 1.1002-1(c) (1960).
82. See Carlton v. United States, 385 F.2d 238, 241 (5th Cir. 1967) (discussing section
1031); B. BirrKER & J. EusTiCE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHARE-
HOLDERS 3-4 (3d abr. student ed. 1971) (discussing section 351).
83. Section 202 (b) of the Revenue Act of 1918, Ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1060, required that gain
be taxed or loss be deducted in any exchange of property other than an exchange of
stock pursuant to a reorganization plan. Moreover, a treasury regulation under the
Act, Reg. 45 Art. 1563, provided that no gain or loes was recognized from acquisition
and subsequent disposition unless a change in substance and not merely form occurred.
Wright, Multiple-Party, Like-Kind Exchanges, 56 A.B.A.J. 281, 281 & n.7 (1970). For
an explanation of the problems encountered under section 202(b) of the 1918 Act, see
64 GONG. REc. 2851 (1923) (remarks of Congressman Green). Congressman Green
stated: "The result of this provision was both injurious to the Treasury and to the
transaction of ordinary business."
84. Ch. 136, § 202, 42 star. 230.
85. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 202(c) (1), 42 Star. 230 (now INr. REv. CODE OF
1954, § 1031); Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 202(c)(3), 42 Star. 230 (now INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954, § 351). This close proximity of the two provisions, representative of their
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sumption of taxability in exchanges of property to one of nontaxability 6
and provided new rules of nonrecognition "for those exchanges or
'trades' in which, although a technical 'gain' may be realized... the tax-
payer actually realizes no cash profit." "I Congress' aim was to disregard
merely formal dispositions that lacked economic or commercial reality"8
and thereby facilitate necessary business readjustnientsO9 By thus elim-
inating the tax consequences, the provision removed any inhibitions the
taxpayer might have about incorporating9 ° or upgrading his holdings
for productive use or for investment. 1
common purpose, continued until the adoption of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
See, e.g., INT. Rtv. CODE OF 1939, ch.1, §§ 112(b) (1), (5), 53 Star. 37; Revenue Act of
1938, ch. 289, §§ 112(b) (1), (5), 52 Stat. 485; Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, §§ 112(b) (1),
(5), 48 Star. 704; Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, §§ 112(b) (1), (5), 47 Star. 196; Revenue
Act of 1928, ch. 852, §§ 112(b) (1), (5), 45 Stat. 816-17; Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27,
§§ 203 (b) (1), (4), 44 Star. 12; Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, §§ 203 (b) (1), (4), 43 Stat.
256.
86. S. REP. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1921) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No.
275]. In discussing section 202(d) of the 1921 Act, Congressman Hawley stated that
"[Ihe amendment liberalizes the law in the interest of the taxpayer . . . [and] also
relieves such a transaction from delay, simplifies the tax return, and promotes such
exchanges of property." 61 CONG. REc. 5201 (1921) (emphasis supplied).
87. S. RE. No. 275, supra note 86, at 11.
88. See Hearings (Confidential) Explanation of 202(c) Before the Senate Finance
Connnittee, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 27, 30 (1921). Dr. Adams of the Treasury Department,
commenting upon transfer of appreciated property to a newly created corporation- (as
is the case in Revenue Ruling 75-292) in exchange for all its stock, stated: "I can not
believe that there is enough difference in the ownership of the property and the stock
under such circumstances to justify us in recognizing taxable gain or deductible loss."
Id. at 30. During these hearings taxes upon such a transaction were described as a
"clog upon enterprise" because "[tWhere has really been no profit made. It is just a
change in the kind and character of title to the property. . . :' Id. (remarks of Senator
Simmons).
89. Id. at 30. See also H.R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921), reprinted in
1939-1 CuM. BULL pt. 2, at 175, 176; 64 CONG. REc. 2855 (1923) (remarks of Congress-
man Green). In explaining the revision of the Act of 1921, Congressman Green stated
that the purposes of the revisions had been to facilitate business transactions. Id.
90. Note, Section 351 of the Internal Revenue Code and "Mid-Stream" Incorporations,
38 U. CIm. L. REv. 96, 106-07 (1969).
91. See S. REP. No. 275, supra note 86, at 11. Because of the liberal provision of the
1921 Act, taxpayers who owned appreciated investment securities were able without
recognition of gain to exchange these for new securities. H.R. REP. No. 1432, 67th
Cong., 4th Sess. 1, 2 (1923) (letter of Andrew Mellon, Secretary of the Treasury).
Because of the resulting severe tax avoidance, id., see also 3 J. MERTzNs, supra note 19,
§ 20.22, at 80, in the Act of March 4, 1923, ch. 294, § 202(c) (1), 42 Star. 1560, the
parenthetical phrase in section 202(c) (1), excluding certain property from nonrecog-
nition status, was expanded to encompass stock, bonds, notes and other evidences of
ownership. Significantly, the reason for excepting such stock for stock exchanges
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The congressional reports 2 explaining the amendments in the Revenue
Act of 19243 reiterate the policy espoused for both sections throughout
their legislative histories, that the transactions covered involve no sub-
stantial change in ownership and thus are not to be taxed until gain is
realized by a sale or an exchange that is the equivalent of a sale.94 Simi-
larly, this same principle recurs throughout the congressional hearings,"'
(stock of one corporation for stock of another uncontrolled corporation) from the
definition of like kind is inapplicable to the situation in Revenue Ruling 75-292. As mani-
fested through legislative history, because of the continuity and identity of interest,
stock received under a section 351 transfer is considered a continuation of the previous
investment in merely a different form so that there is no taxable "cashing in" on the
investment. See notes 88-89 supra & note 137 infra.
92. See, e.g, S. REP. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924), reprinted in 1939-1 CuM.
BvuL. pt. 2, at 275. [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 398).
93. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 203(b) (1), 43 Star. 256 (now INT. REv. CoDn op
1954, § 1031); Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 203(b) (4), 43 Stat. 256 (now INT. REv.
CoDE oF 1954, § 351). For a contemporary overview of the 1924 Act, see Magill, Notes
on the Revenue Act of 1924-Income Tax Provision, 24 CoLU.m L. Rxv. 836 (1924).
94. S. REP. No. 398, supra note 92, at 278. H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong, 1st Sess.
12 (1924). As noted in the Senate report, the provision did not exempt, but merely
postponed gain until realized by a "pure sale or by such an exchange as amounts to a
sale." S. REP. No. 398, supra note 92, at 278. In an exchange between Congressmen
La Guardia and Green, it was established that selling property and immediately ac-
quiring other property for the same business was not a tax-free exchange; because the
property was reduced to cash, any gain would be taxed. 65 CoNG. REc. 2799 (1924).
95. The preliminary report of the subcommittee of Committee on Ways and Means,
printed in Hearings on Revenue Revision Before the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1934), recommended abolishing the exchange and re-
organization provisions found in section 112 in order to prevent tax avoidance and
4mplify the law. The report reiterated that the principle embodied in the sections is
that such transactions "result in mere paper profit, and that to tax them at the time of
exchange [would] seriously interfere with business," id. at 58, but rejected this system
of postponing tax on gain as unsound. Id. at 58. But see id. at 77, wherein Mr. Magill
of the Treasury Department stated that the law should remain unchanged. Mr. Magill
stressed the difficulty of computing the valuation of property in each case and stated
that exempt exchanges were limited strictly to transactions in which it was adminis-
tratively difficult to compute loss or gain. Id. at 56. These statements lend some support
to the view expressed in Century Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 155, 159 (8th
Cir. 1951), that in the enactment of section 112 Congress was concerned with the
administrative problems of computing gain. Although this was a consideration, other
statements during the hearing attest that the major concern was exemption from tax
on "paper profits" so as to encourage necessary business readjustments. Hearings on
Revenue Revisions Before the House Ways and Means Committee, supra at 290-91. See
also Jordan Marsh Co. v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 453, 456 (2d Cir. 1959), in which the
court asserted that if the focus had been on the difficulty of making valuations, Congress
would have provided for nonrecognition of loss and gain in all exchanges.
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debates,96 and committee reports97 pertaining to the 1934 amendments,98
which hold that purely formal "paper" transactions such as incorpora-
tions and like kind exchanges result in no immediate tax consequences 9
Also, case law construing these two provisions consistendy'00 has held
that this theory is the principal justification for both sections. 10' The
cases emphasize that, though gain may have accrued in a constitutional
sense, in such business and investment readjustments there has been only
a nontaxable change in the form of ownership. 02 The transactions are
distinguished from sales because of the taxpayers' continued interest in
96. See, e.g., 78 CONG. REC. 2512 (1934) (letter from the Secretary of the Treasury).
In his letter, the Secretary suggested amendments to the provisions rather than their
elimination because elimination would have had a harmful effect on business whereas
amendment would result in revenue savings and s.ll allow nonrecognition to legitimate
exchanges when the essential continuity of business and retention of interest exist. Id.
97. S. Ru. No. 558, 73d Cong, 2d Sess. (1934), reprinted in 1939-1 CuM. Burr. pt. 2,
at 586, 598-99; H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), reprinted in 1939-1 CuM.
BuLL. pt. 2, at 554, 563-65. The Senate report emphasized that "some legitimate and
desirable business readjustments would be prevented" by elimination of the provisions.
S. REP. No. 558, si'ra at 599.
98. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 112(b) (1), 48 Stat. 704 (now INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 1031); Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 112(b) (5), 48 Stat. 704 (now I=. Ray.
CODE OF 1954, § 351).
99. In H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong, 2d Sess. 13 (1934) this code policy was stated
as follows: A taxpayer whose "money is still tied up in the same kind of property as
that in which it was originally invested . . . is not allowed to compute and deduct his
theoretical loss on the exchange, nor is he charged with a tax on his theoretical profit."
100. For an exception to this, see note 95 supra.
101. See, e.g., Carlton v. United States, 385 F.2d 238, 241 (5th Cir. 1967) (construing
section 1031); Estate of Willett v. Commissioner, 365 F.2d 760, 765 (5th Cir. 1966)
(construing section 351); Wolf v. Commissioner, 357 F.2d 483, 485-86 (9th Cir. 1966)
(construing section 351); Jordan Marsh Co. v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 453, 457-58 (2d
Cir. 1959) (construing section 112(b) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, now
section 1031 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954); Portland Oil Co. v. Commissioner,
109 F.2d 479, 488 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650 (1940) (construing section 112(b)
(5) of the 1928 Act, now section 351 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954); Snead v.
Jackson Sec. & Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 77 F.2d 19, 21 (5th Cir. 1935) (construing
section 112(b) (5) of the 1928 Act); American Compress & Warehouse Co. v. Bender,
70 F.2d 655, 657 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 607 (1934) (construing section 112(b)
(5) of the 1928 Act); E. 1. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 471 F.2d 1211,
1214, 1217 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (construing section 351); H. B. Zachary, 49 T.C. 73, 80 (1967)
(construing section 351); Ethel Black, 35 T.C. 90, 94 (1960) (construing section 1031).
102. See, e.g., Jordan Marsh Co. v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 453, 455 (2d Cir. 1959)
(construing section 112(b) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, now section 1031
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954); Portland Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d
479, 488 (1st Cir. 1940) (construing section 112(b) (5) of the Revenue Act of 1928,
now section 351 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954). See also White, Sleepers that
Travel with Section 351 Transfers, 56 VA. L. Rav. 37 (1970).
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the property exchanged "by virtue of their control of the new corporate
owner of it" 103 under section 351 and by virtue of their receipt of
property of like kind under section 103 1.04
In Revenue Ruling 75-292, the rationale for the denial of section 1031
nonrecognition treatment was that the taxpayer received the property to
exchange, not hold it,1°5 thus deciding, in effect, that a taxpayer cannot
engage in bona fide successive like kind exchanges and still receive fa-
vored treatment because he too will have acquired property to ex-
change, not hold it. As illustrated by the preceding examination of the
legislative histories of the sections, such a result would thwart
the statutory scheme of section 1031, which aims to afford nonrecogni-
tion to a taxpayer who has arranged a continuation of his investment
in like kind property.0 6 Moreover, application of the basic rule of
statutory interpretation that "unless [the words of a statute] explicitly
forbid it, the purpose of the statutory provision is the best test of the
meaning of the words chosen," 107 clearly validates construing the phrase
"property to be held for productive use in trade or business" 108 to in-
clude property acquired to trade in a, subsequent like kind exchange.
Thus, in holding that a section 1031 exchange, when followed by a
ection 351 transfer, did not qualify for favored treatment, the Service
adopted the wrong mode of analysis. Both transactions would have
qualified individually for nonrecognition 19 and both embody the same
103. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 471 F.2d 1211, 1215 (Ct. C.
1973), quoting American Compress & Warehou8e Co., v. Bender, 70 F.2d 655, 657-58
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 607 (1934). The language of section 351 is broad and
embraces some transactions that arguably should be sales, as when one transferor's
economic position changes considerably and his continued control is extremely attenu-
ated. To apply section 351 to such transfers is a "triumph of literalism." B. BiTTrER &
J. EusncE, supra note 82, at 3-4, 5. Yet to allow both sections 1031 and 351 favored
treatment in a transaction combining the two is to enforce the legislative purpose by
facilitating a legitimate business readjustment.
104. See Treas. Reg. 1.1002-1(b) (1960); Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.112 (a)-1(b) (1939), re-
printed in 3 J. MERTENS, supra note 19, § 20.16, at 74. The 1939 regulation elucidates the
code policy of both sections 1031 and 351 providing: "[Alt the time of the exchange par-
ticular differences exist between the property parted with and the property acquired,
but such differences are more formal than substantial. As to these, the Internal Revenue
Code provides that such differences shall not be deemed controlling ... ." Treas. Reg.
118, § 39.112(a)-(1)(b) (1939) supra.
105. Rev. Rul. 75-292, 1975 INT. REV. BULL. No. 29, at 19.
106. See notes 79-104 supra & accompanying text.
107. Cawley v. United States, 272 F.2d 443, 445 (2d Cir. 1959).
108. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1031 (a).
109. Both sections are exceptions to the general rule of recognition of gain. See Treas.
Reg. 1.1002-1(b) (1960).
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legislative philosophy.11 A section 1031 exchange, standing alone,
would receive tax-free treatment; why should that exchange be taxed
merely because it is used in combination with a section 351 transac-
tion?1
It is axiomatic that tax consequences are determined by what was ac-
tually and ultimately done; 12 that is, the transaction must be viewed in
its entirety to determine its true substance.1 3 In conformity with this
requirement, by applying the step transaction doctrine, 4 collapsing the
tandem sections 1031-351 transfers and disregarding the intermediate
step, the end result is that the taxpayer has received stock in exchange
for like kind property. This result, impermissible under the existing
statute, appears to be the real reason for the Service's denial of section
1031 treatment. The enigma lies in the failure by the Service to apply
the widely used step transaction doctrine in this situation.
THE UNQUALIFIED APPLICATION OF THE STEP TRANSACTION
DOCTRINE EFFECTS RESULTS UNDESIRABLE
TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
Under the step transaction doctrine, a tool used in the search for
substance over form," 5 in determining tax consequences the separate
steps in a transaction are consolidated, and the transaction is viewed as
a whole. The doctrine may not be- applied indiscriminately, however." 6
110. See notes 79-104 supra & accompanying text.
111. An application of the Service's reasoning to the reverse situation, in which the
-individual taxpayer first incorporates under section 351 and then has his controlled cor-
poration engage in a section 1031 exchange in order to acquire a larger holding, would
deny to the corporation nonrecognition treatment because it acquired the property not
to hold, but to exchange. But see Estate of Rollin E. Meyer, Sr., 58 T.C. 311, 316 n.2
(1972) (Dawson, J., dissenting in part).
112. Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U.S. 242, 254 (1924).
113. See, e.g., Kanahwa Gas & Util. Co. v. Commissioner, 214 F.2d 685, 691 (5th Cir.
1954); Century Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 155, 159 (8th Cir. 1951).
114. See notes 115-32 infra & accompanying text.
115. See Weiss v. Steam, .265 U.S. 242, 254 (1924); Crenshaw v. United States, 450
F.2d 472, 478 (5th Cir. 1971); Casner v. Commissioner, 450 F.2d 379, 398 (5th Cir. 1971).
See generally Mintz & Plumb, Step Transaction in Corporate Reorganizations, N.Y.U.
12th ANNUAL INsT. ON FED. TAx. 247 (1954).
116. See 3 J. MERTENS, supra note 19, §§ 20.47, at 167, 20.161, at 731. In order to deter-
mine when to apply the doctrine, two approaches have been used. The first involves
the application of the "interdependence" test, in which the court ascertains whether
the steps are so interrelated that one would not have been taken without the other and
a separation of them would destroy the intent of each. See American Wire Fabrics
Corp., 16 T.C. 607, 615 (1951); American Bantam Car. Co., 11 T.C. 397, 405 (1948), aff'd
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just as an integrated transaction may not be divided arbitrarily into inde-
pendent steps,117 independent steps may not be consolidated arbitrarily
to form a whole;"18 only interdependent steps may be collapsed into
one.1
9
Such interdependence clearly exists in the situation described in Reve-
nue Ruling 75-292, because the sections 1031 and 351 exchanges oc-
curred pursuant to a prearranged plan. 20 It is irrelevant that each ex-
change taken separately is a nontaxable event.' 21 Rather, in establishing
the tax consequences of these transfers, the step transaction doctrine
should be applied and both exchanges treated as a single indivisible trans-
action. 22 By thus using sections 1031 and 351 together, nonrecognition
status is lost at the section 1031 stage even though individually each
transfer would be favored, for under the step transaction doctrine, the
per curian, 117 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 920 (1950). See also Mintz
& Plumb, supra note 115, at 250-52. The second approach involves the application of
the "end result" test, in which a transaction is viewed as a whole if the ultimate result
was intended from the outset. See 3 J. MERTENs, supra note 19, § 20.166, at 774-75;
Mintz & Plumb, supra note 115, at 250.
117. See Tennessee, Ala. & Ga. Ry. Co. v. ,Commissioner, 187 F.2d 826, 830 (6th Cir.
1951); Commissioner v. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., 99 F.2d 588, 591 (6th Cir. 1938).
118. See Mintz & Plumb supra note 115, at 248.
119. Relevant factors that should be considered in ascertaining whether a transaction
is an integrated whole are the intent of the partes the time element, the ultimate result
and mutual interdependence of the steps. 3 J. MERTrNs, supra note 19, § 20.47, at 167-68.
See also American Wire Fabrics Corp., 16 T.C. 607 (1951), quoting American Bantam
Car. Co., 11 T.C. 397, 405 (1948), arfd per curam, 177 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1949), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 920 (1950). In Arnerican Wire the court found that a series of steps
should be treated as a single indivisible, transaction only if the steps are "'so inter-
dependent that the legal relations created by one transaction would have been fruitless
without the completion of the series'." 16 T.C. at 613.
Notably, steps may be interdependent even though substantial time has elapsed, because
the test is functional, not temporal. Stanley, Inc. v. Schuster, 295 F. Supp. 812, 817-18
(S.D. Ohio 1969), aff'd per curiam, 421 F.2d 1360 (6th Cir. 1970) (two steps separated
by four years held to constitute a single transfer). See also 3 J. MERTaENS, supra note 19,
5 20.161, at 737-38; Mintz & Plumb, supra note 115, at 248.
120. See Rev. Rul. 70-140, 1970-1 CuM. BuLL. 73 (two steps of a transaction carried
out according to a prearranged, integrated plan cannot be considered separately for
tax purposes); 3 J. MERTENS, supra note 19, § 20.161, at 738. See also May Broadcasting
Co. v. United States, 200 F.2d 852, 857 (8th Cir. 1953).
121. Crenshaw v. United States, 450 F.2d 472, 475-76, 478 (5th Cir. 1971); Pickard v.
Commissioner, 113 F.2d 488 (2d Cir.), aff'g per curiam, 40 B.T.A. 258 (1940).
122. See, e.g., Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Commissioner, 430 F.2d 1185, 1192 (5th
Cir. 1970); Kanahwa Gas & Util. Co. v. Commissioner, 214 F.2d 685, 691 (5th Cir. 1954).
In Kanabwa Gas & Utilities Co., the court stated that preconceived unitary plans will
be regarded as an entirety "whether the effect of so doing is the imposition of or relief
from taxation." Id.
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result of the two transactions is the receipt of stock for like kind prop-
erty. Although acceptable under section 351, this result affronts
section 10 3 1.123
• Why then, in denying section 1031 treatment to this integrated trans-
action, did the Service fail to apply such a well established and apparently
appropriate doctrine? Certainly an application of the step transaction
doctrine to situations with successive section 1031 exchanges is mandated
by legislative history 124 and by the Service's acceptance of the closely
analogous simultaneous three-way exchange.125 In a three-way exchange,
the taxpayer holds acceptable like kind property throughout the ex-
change transaction and clearly qualifies for nonrecognition. 26 On the
other hand, a three-party, two-step exchange may be structured in such
a manner as to entail the use of impermissible property in the exchange
and thus affront the express wording of section 103 1, while at the same
time qualifying as a valid section 1031 exchange under the step transac-
tion doctrine. For instance, if a taxpayer arranges to exchange his busi-
ness real estate for stock of an uncontrolled corporation, and then, pur-
suant to a prearranged plan, exchanges the acquired stock for a third
party's business real estate,2 7 under the step transaction doctrine, by
viewing the exchange in its entirety and disregarding the intermediate
step, 28 the taxpayer would qualify for section 1031 treatment. 29 Such
an application of the doctrine, however, ignores the fact that the inter-
mediate step in the exchange involved the receipt of impermissible
section 1031 property,'30 and thereby suggests that the use of such prop-
123. See note 1 supra.
124. See notes 79-104 supra & accompanying text.
125. See notes 69-78 supra & accompanying text.
126. See notes 74-76 supra & accompanying text.
127. If A owns business real estate PA; B owns stock of corporation X and C owns
business real estate PC, the transaction is as follows:
A exchanges PA with B for stock of corporation X.
A exchanges the stock of corporation X with C for PC.
128. Upon disregarding the intermediate step, see note 77 supra, A has exchanged, in
effect, PA for PC, a transfer of business real estate, clearly a like kind transaction under
section 1031. See note 40 supra & accompanying text.
129. That the intermediate step involved a transaction taxable under section 1031 (that
is, the exchange of business real property for stock), see Irr. Rnv. CODE OF 1954, § 1031
(a), does not make this transaction considered in its entirety taxable under the step
transaction doctrine because "the individual tax significance of each step is irrelevant
when, considered as a whole, they all amount to no more than a single transaction...
Crenshaw v. United States, 450 F.2d 472, 476 (5th Cir. 1971).
130. See note I supra.
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erty in the disregarded intermediate step is acceptable, a result that
offends the express wording of section 1031.' 3' Moreover, the use of
the step transaction doctrine in this type of exchange contravenes the
underlying assumption of section 1031 that the new property is substan-
tially a continuation of the prior investment still unliquidated. The tax-
payer's continuity of interest in his business real estate was terminated
by the receipt of the stock as full consideration for his property, and the
proceeds then merely were reinvested in like kind property.u 2 The
Service, therefore, may have failed to apply the step transaction doctrine
in Revenue Ruling 75-292 because of a fear of potential resulting viola-
tions of the express wording and underlying basis of section 1031.
A SUGGESTED REVISION OF THE STATUTE TO ALLOW
FOR THE COMBINED USE OF SECTIONS 1031 AND 351
Examination of the step transaction doctrine has revealed that a blanket
application of the doctrine to three-party, two-step exchanges may con-
travene both the explicit language -Pf section 1031, by allowing the
exchange of impermissible property, and the section's underlying policy
of continuity of investment.'33 Nevertheless, because such prop-
erty was received via a section 351 transfer and in pursuit of the
type of legitimate business needs Congress sought to facilitate, the facts
of Revenue Ruling 75-292 can be distinguished clearly from other three-
party, two-step transactions, in which ifripermissible property intervenes
via another route. In the latter situation, the taxpayer's receipt of the
131. "No gain or loss shall be recognized if property held for production use in
trade or business or for investment (not including ... stocks . . .) is exchanged ...
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1031(a).
132. In opposition to the Service's apparent stance it has been proposed that the most
logical and fair approach to determining the substance of section 1031 exchanges is
to view the net result of the completed transaction, focusing simply on whether like
kind property was transferred and ultimately received. See Leslie Q. Coupe, 52 T.C.
394, 415 (1969) (Simpson, J., concurring). See also Section 1031, supra note 22, at
524-25; Tax Free, supra note 18, at 474; 24 ARK. L. REV. 142, 147 (1971). Such an
approach would implicitly allow the use of impermissible property during the inter-
vening step. This approach has been rejected by the courts. For example, in Carlton v.
United States, 385 F.2d 238, 241 (5th Cir. 1967), the court stated that to ascertain the
reality of a transaction it could not "merely look at the beginning and end . . .
without observing the steps taken to reach that end," and in John M. Rogers, 44 T.C.
126, 136 (1965), the court rejected the taxpayer's argument that "the difference in how
the end result is accomplished is immaterial."
133. See note 127-32 supra & accompanying text.
[ ol. 17:599 -
REVENUiE RULiNG 75-292
impermissible property 34 from a third party as consideration for his
property results in a "cashing in" of his investment in that property."3 5
His subsequent reexchange is merely a reinvestment of the proceeds from
the sale of the original property. In marked contrast, the impermissible
property received by a taxpayer in an exchange with a corporation he
controls is considered, as established by legislative history, 36 a continua-
tion of the taxpayer's prior investment, effectuating merely a non-
taxable change in the form of ownership. 3 7 The exchange in Revenue
Ruling 75-292 thus retains the necessary continuity of investment even
though the receipt of stock contravenes the language of section 1031.
Therefore, had the Service administratively legislated and held permis-
sible a transaction involving a section 1031 exchange coupled with a
subsequent section 351 transfer, it would have eroded the explicit Con-
gressional limitation that property cannot be exchanged for stock.
Because, in the facts of the revenue ruling, the requisite continuity of
interest and control are present, cannot the second step (the section 351
transfer) be viewed as a continuation of a like kind investment in merely
a different form? That sections 1031 and 351 share common goals, both
aiming to facilitate necessary business readjustments and avoid taxation
of mere changes in form of investment, is manifest through the examina-
tion of their legislative histories138 and of case law construing the sec-
tions.' 39 Because of this close interrelation and the bona fide business
needs sought, incorporation of a sole proprietorship accompanied by a
transfer of newly acquired expanded facilities, the two sections should
be allowed to coexist in tandem without destroying the tax-free status
of either.
The defect thus appears to lie not in the Internal Revenue Service's
disallowance of section 1031 treatment under the existing statute, but
134. For an example of this type of three-party, tvo-step exchange, see notes 127-32
supra & accompanying text.
135. See note 1 supra.
136. See notes 79-104 supra & accompanying text.
137. This contention is supported by the assertion in W & K Holding Corp., 38
B.T.A. 803 (1938), that a change from individual to corporate ownership works no
substantial change in the beneficial ownership and control of the property. Id. at 839.
In George A. Nye, 50 T.C. 203 (1969), stock transferred under section 351 was deemed
evidence of a continuing investment in the property given as a permanent contribution to
the corporation. Id. at 213. Similarly, in Lubrot v. Burnet, 57 F.2d 413 (D.C. Cir. 1932),
the court stated that certificates of stock in a controlled corporation "were for all prac-
tical purposes .. . muniments of title to the same property' Id. at 414.
138. See notes 79-104 supra & accompanying text.
139. See notes 100-104 supra & accompanying text.
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rather in Congress' failure to recognize statutorily the interplay between
the two sections so as to allow the combined use of the provisions to
fulfill valid business and investment needs and thus further their common
goals. Congress shou-ld uphold the policy espoused for each section in-
dividually by expressly allowing the combined use of the two. It is
proposed, therefore, that section 1031 be revised to allow the receipt of
stock as an end result but only when the section 1031 exchange is
coupled with a section 351 transfer.1 40
/
140. It is immaterial whether the section 351 transfer precedes or follows the section
1031 exchange.
